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Note
Historians Before the Bench: Friends of
the Court, Foes of Originalism
Joshua Stein*
Historians' amicus briefs play a special role before today's Supreme
Court as it grapples with the law's "original meaning."' Since 2000,
professional historians have participated in forty-six amicus briefs before
the Supreme Court.2 Thirty-two of these came after 2006. Historians had
signed only six between 1989 and 1999. In spite of their enthusiastic
participation, historians are neither getting the results they would like nor
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2014; UCLA, Ph.D. (History) 2009. lam grateful to Joshua Levin
and the Notes Committee of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities for editing this Note. I must
also thank Linda Greenhouse for her mentorship and advice and Trevor Merrill, who read this piece
countless times.
1. On originalism and its alternatives, see generally JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011),
which argues that originalism can be tailored to contemporaneous concerns; RANDY BARNETI,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2005), which advocates for a
return to the Constitution's "original meaning"; and PAMELA S. KARLAN, GOODwIN Liu &
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 26 (2010), which puts
forward an alternative to originalism the authors call "constitutional fidelity."
2. Data current as of late 2012. "Professional historians" for the sake of this Note are scholars in
university history departments or legal faculty that identify as legal historians. Lawyers who write
historically, but do not identify themselves as historians, were not included in this study.
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using means they particularly want to employ.3 This Note is directed
toward historians, who I hope will continue to attempt to influence the
Court, and legal practitioners, who should reconsider how they argue over
the past.
Historians, I contend, can more effectively influence the Court and
reclaim their authority to interpret the past without surrendering their
professional principles. They must first understand that their attempts to
get involved in originalist debates fall short in three ways: (1) they traffic
in certitudes, which are anathema to the historical vocation; (2) they
accept and legitimize the normative, originalist premise that the past ought
to inform the present; and (3) they search for historical analogies to satisfy
the Court's originalists when they are better served locating or
contextualizing persuasive case law. This Note will examine these three
matters in turn in Parts One, Two and Three. In Part Four, I argue that
historians can and should pursue alternative approaches in their briefs.
Responding to each of the three issues named above, respectively, they
should (1) attack originalist arguments by destabilizing their historical
conclusions, (2) adopt alternatives to originalist advocacy in their amicus
briefs, or (3) craft briefs narrowly in the fashion of a historical "special
master." All three approaches would bring an urgent relevancy to
historical advocacy without sacrificing historical principles.
Each of these options would address the aforementioned concerns.
Option one puts historians in their methodological comfort zone; they can
"tell it like it is" by emphasizing the uncertainty of the past without trying
to replace one erroneously certain version of the past with another. Option
two makes the Constitution more of a moving target, one that shifts along
with society. Option three is so fact-specific and narrowly tailored that
partisan politics could be pushed aside by a focus on precedent and, to the
extent possible, on facts rather than arguments. These briefs would target
discrete precedential and factual questions that historians believe can help
the Court decide a particular case.
Before homing in on key vulnerabilities in historical advocacy, it is
helpful to first try to understand how history as used in the law is quite
different from history as interpreted by a historian. William Novak has a
good vantage point over this divergence. Formerly of the history
department at the University of Chicago, now professor at the University
of Michigan Law School, Novak observes, "[H]istories written by lawyers
and historians often seem to be composed by entirely different animals-
hedgehogs and foxes in Rakove's application of Isaiah Berlin's famous
3. A "win" indicates that the party on whose behalf the amicus brief was submitted received a
desirable judgment. The win-loss record is less than an even split: twenty-one wins, twenty-six losses,
and four undecided. Of the mere nine briefs that eamed a citation from the Supreme Court, only four
of them supported the winning side, that is, were submitted on behalf of the party who won before the
Court. Amicus data available upon request.
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typology-after distinctly different kinds of intellectual prey."' Novak
accuses jurists of adhering to a kind of "constitutional theology" that
distorts the past.
Professional historians long ago slew the Whig dragons that had
generations of Americans learning to worship the "heroes" of the past at
the expense of a more complete and nuanced history.' The histories that
dominate the American law, both in scholarship and practice, have gone
through no such fire trials. This is especially a problem with originalism.
Historians who offer originalist arguments do not typically share the
philosophical zeal of legal practitioners about the legitimacy of the
practice. Nevertheless, when they do jump into the fray, they often offer
historical conclusions packaged in originalist terms since doing so
represents a sure-fire way to contribute to legal discourse. Yet they may
find their efforts blunted by the fact that originalism's most fervent
practitioners rarely find that the historical record forces them to conclude
in a way that runs counter to their principles or politics.
The clearest practical distinction between a historian's history and a
lawyer's is that the lawyer is trying to win a case. For the most part,
furthermore, lawyers' past is about precedent. And when lawyers turn to a
past beyond case law, they handle history as dilettantes. Lawyers are not
beholden to any vocational ethos about history and can search for
handpicked facts and arguments in the history books to advance their
cause. Surely attorneys should not seek victory at any cost, but they are
entrusted with the responsibility of zealous advocacy. Just as they hunt for
favorable precedent, so too they try to illuminate a sympathetic past.
Lawyers view history as they do any other expertise hired for trial-as a
tool to win. This results in a cynical view of the past that historians cannot
quite abide.
Amicus briefs afford professional historians an as yet unseized
opportunity to change how legal practitioners approach history. Were
historians to engage the legal world over the use of history, historians
could be more effective in influencing adjudication and advocating on
4. William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in American Public
Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 623, 626 (citing Stuart Banner, Legal History andLegal Scholarship, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 37 (1998); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017 (1981); Robert W. Gordon, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 339 (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996); William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986); Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of
History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999)).
5. See WILLIAM J. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 465 (1988) ("Formally, professional historians disparaged the
teleological 'Whig Interpretation of history,' in which historical actors were graded according to
whether they advanced or retarded the growth of liberalism and democracy."). Novick continues to
explain that in spite of this formal repudiation, Whiggish history was not killed off easily or entirely.
See id.
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behalf of a more complicated version of the past that matches their own, a
past that is neither determinate nor worthy of wholesale emulation.
Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars may prefer easy answers. But
litigation and the law have become more and more complex. The legal
world has adapted to these complexities. It can adapt to a more
complicated understanding of the past too.
Such a substantial change in the use of history in the law would require
a major paradigm shift. If that change comes about, the law's use of
history will be better equipped to survive originalism's inevitable
obsolescence. Legal theories rise and fall; this is to be expected. Rather
than twist historical advocacy to fit the latest fashion, most of the
approaches suggested here can find some sort of permanence by honestly
hewing to historical methodologies.6
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT CASES AND ORIGINALISM'S FALSE
CERTAINTY
Historical study and originalist legal advocacy are at fundamental odds
with one another when it comes to one key issue: certainty. But whatever
their professional discomfort may have been, certainty was precisely the
idiom in which the professional historians offered their conclusions in
Heller and McDonald. In these, historians attempted to influence the law
by dialing back their convictions that the past is often indeterminate. Yet
even though historians conformed to the originalist premise of certainty,
the Court still ruled against their side. This shows that something other
than methodological parity was preventing the historians from
succeeding-what prevented the historians from succeeding was that their
results contradicted "the [justices'] own policy preferences."'
This Part documents how historians attempted to weigh in on the past in
the high-profile Second Amendment cases of Heller and McDonald. In
these, they tried to tell the Court what they thought the Founders thought
the Second Amendment meant. Their version of the past lost out to an
account that was, unsurprisingly, able to give the Court's majority the past
it needed to rule the way it wanted to. This, it turns out, should have been
anticipated by historians. They know all too well how multiple versions of
the past sit waiting to be exploited, making the selection of a convenient
6. 1 offer two caveats on this point. First, one scholar is confident that originalism is a kind of
cyclical response to constitutional flux, that its prominence waxes and wanes along with reform:
"[Originalism] will reemerge, as it always has, when a political constituency issues a call for
constitutional restoration following an era of constitutional flux." Jamal Greene, Heller High Water:
The Future of Originalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 325 (2009). Second, one could make the same
arguments about historians and historical theories. But the belief in an uncertain past that ought not
carry normative weight came about neither swiftly nor recently. It appears to this scholar at least as
here to stay.
7. Bret Boyce, Heller, McDonald and Originalism, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 2, 8.
[Vol. 25:359362
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one predictable. The discussion that follows explores how historians'
arguments fell on the Court like arrows on tanks. But, first, it outlines why
an originalist faith in certainty is so antithetical to the historical vocation.
A. The Only Consensus: Why Historians Reject Certainties
Historians may attempt to be, but never quite are, neutral or objective.
But one strand does tie historians together: their agreement to disagree on
an existential question, which the eminent British historian, E.H. Carr,
famously asked: "What is History?"' Put a hundred historians in a room
and ask them that question, and you will likely get a hundred answers.
Have a hundred of them study the same time period, and you will have a
hundred different versions of the past.
To the extent historians do have a consensus, however, it is at odds with
a central component of originalist interpretation: historians believe there is
no single authoritative version of the past. And it is this essential tenet of
the modem historical discipline that stands in stark contrast to the
certainties in which originalist interpretations often trade. Gordon Wood,
dean of early American historians, explains the historians' consensus
around doubt and complexity: "The past in the hands of expert historians
becomes a different world, a complicated world that requires considerable
historical imagination to recover with any degree of accuracy. The
complexity . . . comes with the realization that the participants were
limited by forces that they did not understand or were even aware o[fj."9
Originalists believe that the Constitution should reflect the values and
preferences of the founding era (or the eras synchronous with whenever a
particular amendment or law was put into effect). Historians generally do
not consider it possible to know with certainty what a particular group of
people in a particular past would prefer. Historians live to play in the
messy mud of the past. Jurists, on the other hand, need answers. Historians
certainly know how to write persuasively, and will be more than happy to
offer their best guess. But they generally avoid the kinds of winner-take-
all debates that lie at the heart of an adversarial system.
Harvard historian Jill Lepore wrote recently that originalism is akin to
"historical fundamentalism, which is to history what astrology is to
astronomy, what alchemy is to chemistry, what creationism is to
evolution."io "Originalism may not be good history," Gordon Wood
replied, "but it is a philosophy of legal and constitutional interpretation
that has engaged some of the best minds in the country's law schools over
8. E.H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961).
9. Gordon Wood, The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History, 10 HIST.
SPEAKING, Jan. 2009, at 2, 5.
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the past three decades or so." As such, originalism should not be
approached "cavalierly."" Wood, ever the peacemaker, could not hope to
persuade all of his colleagues to be so diplomatic. Historian Paul
Finkelman, who has signed several amicus briefs, says he does not "know
any serious historians that believe you can do original-intent analysis for
most cases. It doesn't work well if you take history seriously. [The past] is
much too complicated. Courts don't like complicated. They want history
to prove something, and history doesn't do that."l 2 Another legal historian,
Peter Hoffer, believes that originalism is a recipe for misadventure: "No
working historian (that is, historian teaching in a history department)
credits any of the various versions of originalism, because we know how
difficult it is to do the history that would substantiate such a version of
interpretation."13
B. Searching for a Determinate Past in the Second Amendment Cases
The animus harbored by historians toward originalism peaked between
2008 and 2010, when the Court handed down two monumental Second
Amendment decisions rooted in originalist arguments.' 4 In these, the Court
twice split five to four, rejecting arguments from prominent constitutional
historians that the Framers had no intention of drafting a Second
Amendment right to keep arms in self-defense.
Heller was conceived and delivered as a Second Amendment test case.
A clash over the right to bear arms had long been brewing. With gun-
rights supporters correctly sensing a shift in the zeitgeist, they seized the
opportunity to win the Court's recognition of an individual right to bear
arms. Their goal in the short term was to have the Court invalidate the
Firearms Control Regulations Act, which banned handguns in D.C." Gun-
rights advocates throughout the country, not just in the District, badly
wanted the Court to take on the law. Not since United States v. Miller, in
1939, had the Supreme Court defined the limits of the Second
Amendment. 6 The Roberts Court seemed amenable to expanding the
Second Amendment beyond its stated "militia" connection to the
individual use of firearms.
Six handpicked plaintiffs made up the group that would challenge the
handgun ban. The eponymous Heller was a police officer. The Cato
11. Id.
12. Telephone Interview with Paul Finkelman, Professor of Law, Univ. of Albany (June 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Finkelman Interview].
13. Email from Peter Charles Hoffer, Professor of History, Univ. of Georgia, to Joshua Stein
(June 15, 2012, 17:05 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoffer Interview].
14. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008).
15. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 7-2507.02.
16. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
364 [Vol. 25:359
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Institute took the lead, filing for an injunction, which the district court
soon dismissed." In a two-to-one decision in the D.C. Circuit, Heller won,
as the panel invalidated several provisions of the Act.' The District of
Columbia sought an en banc hearing. When it was denied, it petitioned to
the Supreme Court. Those backing the plaintiff were likely giddy at the
thought of the Court taking on the case. In a five-to-four decision, the
Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit decision.
Pulitzer-prize winning historian Jack Rakove and his colleagues
authored an amicus brief claiming an interest in "the Court having an
informed understanding of the history that led to the adoption of the
Second Amendment."" From the onset, the brief called for an originalist
interpretation, asking and answering a question that would demand a "yes
or no" answer rooted in historical certainties they would normally avoid in
their own professional work. "The question can be elaborated and restated
in this way: Did the framers and ratifiers of the Amendment believe they
were constitutionally entrenching an individual right to keep arms for
personal protection?" 20
Rather than look solely at the Founders' texts, the brief-writers turned
toward the thoughts of the people ratifying the Constitution. It was
original-intent analysis, with a twist. The brief-writers argued that,
"recovering that context involves more than snatching a line from
Blackstone's Commentaries or Madison's 46th Federalist, or ringing
endless changes on the references to hunting and fowling in the Dissent of
the Anti-Federalist minority in the Pennsylvania ratification convention."2'
Instead, context requires looking at popular conceptions of the right in
ratification debates. Because the Constitution's sovereignty rests in the
people's hands, what they thought they were ratifying should matter to the
Court.
Two right-leaning scholars, on the other hand, could claim victory
because the side for which their brief advocated, Heller's side, won. David
Hardy and Joseph Olson submitted an amicus brief under the imprimatur
of the "Amicus Academics for the Second Amendment ('A2A')."2 2 They
may not have had the resumes of Rakove and his colleagues, but they had
the historical analysis that carried the majority in the Court. Hardy is an
17. See Robert A. Levy, Fighting for our Right to Bear Arms, BOS. GLOBE, Mar 18, 2008, http://
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2008/03/18/fightingfor our right-to
bear arms.
18. Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
19. Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Dist. of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
[Ratification And Original Public Meaning], Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No.
07-290) [hereinafter A2A Brief].
Stein 365
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Arizona lawyer who has written a conspiracy-theory study of the Branch
Davidian incident in Waco, Texas.23 Hardy is not a trained historian, but
holds a J.D. from the University of Arizona.
His counterpart was Joseph Olson. Unlike Hardy, Olson has published
on legal history in academic outlets. He also co-authored an article on gun
rights with Clayton Cramer. 24 Cramer is well known to historians of the
Second Amendment for his withering attacks on the veracity of Michael
Bellesiles's history of gun ownership, Arming America, a prize-winning
book that was later discredited. 25 The brief aimed to establish that the
"petitioners' attempt to explain the purpose of the Second Amendment
misreads the historical record, mistakes the relationship between arms and
militia duty, and improperly applies the very interpretative principle it
invokes." 26 Hardy and Olson concluded that "the operative clause of the
Second Amendment is as unambiguous as any command of the First
Amendment."27 Although most academic historians would disagree with
their assessment, it lent a scholarly sheen to the arguments the Court
would advance. Their brief represents the best example of what may be a
trend to look out for: right-wing efforts to counter the academic
mainstream.
As scholars, Hardy and Olson certainly lacked the mainstream
reputations of Stanford's Rakove, who holds the intimidating title of the
"William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies and
professor of political science and (by courtesy) law at Stanford."
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's opinion, which tracked Olson and Hardy's
argument closely, was a classic example of his own brand of textual
originalism. Justice Scalia's opinion advanced the argument that the
Second Amendment was not limited to militia applications. The
Amendment's preface, the Court held, was not intended to limit its
operative second clause.
The Constitution, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, could have
included language on self-defense and hunting, as Pennsylvania's or
Vermont's constitutions had, but it did not.2 8 In a separate dissent, Justice
Breyer waxed historical as he noted that gunpowder regulations in the
founding era that were much stricter than trigger-lock requirements and
handgun bans are today.29 Justice Breyer cited several early restrictions on
23. DAVID HARDY, THIS IS NOT AN ASSAULT: PENETRATING THE WEB OF OFFICIAL LIES
REGARDING THE WACO INCIDENT (2001).
24. Joseph Olson & Clayton E. Cramer, What Did "Bear Arms" Mean in the Second Amendment?
6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 511 (2008).
25. Clayton E. Cramer, Fraud in Michael Bellesiles's Arming America (2001), available at
http://www.claytoncramer.com/unpublished/ArmingAmericaFraud.pdf.
26. A2A Brief, supra note 22, at 41.
27. Id.
28. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
29. Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 25:359366
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the right to bear arms. "The majority criticizes my citation of these
colonial laws . . . . But, as much as it tries, it cannot ignore their
existence." 30
Justice Scalia came out swinging against the dissenters, wielding a
bludgeon whittled from history. He was determined to prove that the
Stevens dissent "flatly misreads the historical record." 31 After calling its
textual analysis "grotesque,"32 Scalia proceeded to argue that "there seems
to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms." 3 3 Justice
Scalia peppered his opinion with historical judgments. He argued, for
example, that fears of tyranny forced the Framers to codify an individual
right to bear arms they already thought was theirs by common law:
"During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal government
would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army
or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric." 34
Justice Stevens, naturally, disagreed: "[T]he drafting history of the
Amendment demonstrates that its Framers rejected proposals that would
have broadened its coverage to include [non-militia uses for arms]."3 I He
concluded, "The history of the adoption of the Amendment thus describes
an overriding concern about the potential threat to state sovereignty that a
federal standing army would pose, and a desire to protect the States'
militias as the means by which to guard against that danger." 36 Justice
Stevens proceeded to invoke the Court's rulings over time on the Second
Amendment, concluding that "for most of our history, the invalidity of
Second-Amendment-based objections to firearms regulations has been
well settled and uncontroversial."3 7
Many historians, like Saul Cornell, were not pleased with the Court's
use of history in Heller. Cornell's explanation helps us understand why the
Rakove effort failed, even though it hewed closely to the original-intent
analysis favored by the Court. "It seems clear that [Heller] is not the
triumph of a new methodology, but really just the latest incarnation of the
old law office history-a results oriented methodology in which evidence
is selectively gathered and interpreted to produce a preordained
conclusion."" Heller was a moment for pause for historians, followed
30. Id. at 686.
31. Id. at 603.
32. Id. at 587.
33. Id. at 595,
34. Id. at 598. Justice Scalia asserted that the dissent ignored "the historical reality that the Second
Amendment was not intended to lay down a 'novel principl[e],"' but rather codified a right "inherited
from our English ancestors." Id. at 599 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).
35. Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 661.
38. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss, Same
Stein 367
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soon after by another crushing blow in McDonald
Gun-rights advocates, after Heller, grew excited at the prospect of
applying recently expanded Second-Amendment jurisprudence to state
and city laws. In Chicago, a group of citizens decided to sue the city over
its ordinance banning handguns. They lost at both the district and circuit
level. The Supreme Court took the case and focused its hearings on the
key legal issue of "selective incorporation."39
The Court has held that the privileges and immunities clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the Bill of Rights.40 Instead, a
right must be "fundamental" to our system of "ordered liberty" to merit
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 1
Second-Amendment rights were fundamental, according to the majority,
making them just as applicable to state as to federal law. The Court, on
these grounds, struck down the handgun-ban in Chicago.
One group of legal scholars including historians John Witt and William
Novak submitted a brief (one of four efforts by historians) on the history
of robust Second-Amendment regulation. They avoided the strictly "legal"
question of incorporation. Instead, the brief-writers detailed how, after
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, states continued to exercise
broad rights to regulate guns. "The historical record shows that states and
municipalities have long enjoyed authority to enact reasonable non-
discriminatory gun safety regulations, including bans on the possession of
particularly dangerous classes of weapons." 42 The amici offered the kind
of certitudes that originalists typically employ: "It would therefore be
contrary to early practice under the Fourteenth Amendment to block states
and cities from enacting reasonable gun regulations."43 Contemporaneous
regulations that did not raise Constitutional eyebrows then would help the
Court see that similar legislation should not today do the same.
The Court disagreed, splitting five to four, just as in Heller. Justice
Alito's majority opinion essentially adopted Heller's version of history,
wherein the right to bear arms was fundamental because of the right to
as the Old Boss, " 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2009) [hereinafter Cornell, New Originalism]; see
Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 609 (2008); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 923, 981 (2009) (offering perspectives on how originalism came to dominate the decision in
Heller).
39. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
40. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); see also, Richard L. Aynes, McDonald v.
Chicago, Self-defense, the Right to Bear Arms, and the Future, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL'Y 181,
185-86 (2011) (arguing that the Court misread the Slaughter-House Cases).
41. Palkov. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
42. Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
43. Id. at 3.
[Vol. 25:359368
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self-defense.44 The Court recited the historical conclusions from the 2008
case, arguing that the original intentions behind an individual right to bear
arms evinced the importance of that right to the country's system of
ordered liberty. Yet, in spite of the historical bent of the Court's analysis,
which it adopted by proxy through Heller, the opinion did not once cite
any of the four briefs historians had submitted in the case.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, denounced the majority's version of history,
both in Heller and McDonald: "Justice Scalia's defense of his method,
which holds out objectivity and restraint as its cardinal-and, it seems,
only-virtues, is unsatisfying on its own terms. For a limitless number of
subjective judgments may be smuggled into his historical analysis. Worse,
they may be buried in the analysis."4 5 Stevens held out his own use of
history as a counterexample: "At least with my approach, the judge's cards
are laid on the table for all to see, and to critique." 4 6
McDonald had finally pushed the Court minority over the edge. Rather
than simply fight the majority's version of history with their own, the
dissent turned toward a much more nuanced tactic. Its approach to
originalism now espoused the ethos of professional historians: history is
neither linear nor certain.
Justice Breyer also questioned the Court's reliance upon the history,
particularly given that history was not their professional expertise:
"Subsequent scholarly writing reveals why disputed history provides
treacherous ground on which to build decisions written by judges who are
not expert at history."4 7 Justice Breyer listed a litany of historical works
critical of the history employed by the majority in Heller.48 He also
mentioned the brief by English legal historians on the misreading of
Blackstone: "The historians now tell us, however, that the right to which
Blackstone referred had, not nothing, but everything, to do with the
militia." 4 9
Historians themselves would likely agree with Justice Breyer; his
approach points toward a future in which more jurists can discuss history
with the kind of complexity historians prefer. Yet, Justices Stevens and
Breyer seem to have mobilized behind the indeterminacy of historical
interpretation precisely as the historians disavowed that commitment and
replaced it with the certainty-talk of originalists.
To historians, who failed to triumph even when willing to play along,
originalist analysis must seem like a frustrating, teleological exercise, in
44. "Self-defense is a basic right." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
45. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3118 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 3121-22 (citing Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-152 1)).
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which jurists never conclude anything other than what they set out to
conclude. Both the Heller and McDonald decisions, Finkelman said, "are
horrible on the history."50
II. LA WRENCE AND THE PAST'S NORMATIVE POWER
Historians may also feel uncomfortable about assigning normative
power to the past to guide decisions in the present. Originalist
interpretation can lead the Court and the historians who seek to persuade it
to legitimize viewpoints and values that conflict with modern moralities.
Accepting the premise that the past ought to inform the present is
dangerous, particularly when it comes to civil rights. Using the past to
deny a group its rights is to promote an insidious historical agenda. This
section documents how historians sought to convince the Court that there
was no original intent for laws against homosexual sodomy to stand on. I
argue that in doing so historians risked anchoring rights for homosexuals
to ages hostile to them.
A. Normativity and Originalism's Undeserved Power over the Law
Aside from his qualms about the past's indeterminacy, Justice Stevens
raised another grievance in his McDonald dissent: the Court should not
automatically give the past normative weight in adjudication. I argue in
Part Two that historians should share his concern and should tread
especially carefully when attempting to locate the legal-historical
foundation for civil rights in the past.
For Justice Stevens, the biggest problem with looking to the Americans
of the past for answers was that they could be wrong. The Justice opined,
"Some notions that many Americans deeply believed to be true, at one
time, turned out not to be true . . . . The fact that we have a written
Constitution does not consign this Nation to a static legal existence.""1
Justice Stevens sought, it seems, to criticize the manner in which the Court
attached too much importance to originalist interpretations. He continued,
"[I]t makes little sense to give history dispositive weight in every case.
And it makes especially little sense to answer questions like whether the
right to bear arms is 'fundamental' by focusing only on the past."52
Historians do not generally deign to pass value judgments on the past,
and to extent they do, it is usually to "revise" our gauzy, celebratory
accounts of heroism and progress. Originalists, on the other hand, tend to
ascribe greatness to the Founders. They whitewash history by passing on
the puffery of the nation's founding myths. Historians should have serious
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philosophical reservations with original-intent analysis for that reason
alone, irrespective of their professional commitment to the indeterminacy
of the past.
Historians should be further discouraged by the fact that there is no
binding legal precedent for or consensus surrounding original-intent
analysis. That is to say, it represents a special torment to forsake long-held
professional principles for a practice that even many legal scholars and
lawyers find dubious. The place of originalism in the canons of legal
interpretation is not, appearances perhaps to the contrary, a settled
question. Nothing in the Constitution and no major court decision from the
founding era can be cited by lawyers or judges today holding that "when
case law is lacking and plain text analysis falls short, thou shalt turn to
pronunciations of the framers' intent." Justice Marshall understood this
quite early on, when he wrote: "It would have been an unwise attempt to
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly."" Marshall did not believe the Constitution
intended "to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to
circumstances." 54
In short, historians should be deeply mindful both of their own
objections to giving the past normative weight and of the controversy and
doubt swirling around original-intent analysis.15
B. Lawrence v. Texas and the Ghosts of Civil Rights'Past
No recent case better demonstrates the perils of a normative approach to
the past than Lawrence v. Texas.56 In allowing the past to speak to the
present in an authoritative tone, the Court jeopardizes civil rights, for the
past was not so kind. It featured, as we now know, the systemic legal
subordination of marginalized populations.
In 1998, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner were arrested for engaging in
consensual sex in Houston. A justice of the peace convicted them of a
class C misdemeanor under Chapter 21 of the Texas Penal Code for
53. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
54. Id.
55. 1 cannot, of course, launch into a wholesale and comprehensive discussion of the merits of
originalist interpretation as a legal practice. However, my point is that historians should harbor serious
concerns about allowing the past to constrain the present in this fashion. Civil rights simply do not
have the best "original" track record. In my opinion, Brown v. Board ofEducation illustrates this point
well. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor
Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995). Akhil Reed Amar's argument that the Nineteenth Amendment
would have proven sufficient to strike down the Texas anti-abortion law is another example of liberal-
leaning originalism worth exploring. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 277 (2012).
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
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"deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."57
After a Texas Court of Appeals sustained the conviction and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals denied their petition, the case rose to the
United States Supreme Court on July 16, 2002.
The responsibility for speaking on Lawrence and Garner's behalf in the
Court fell to Paul Smith, a lawyer for Jenner and Block. Smith, who is
gay, served as a law clerk to Justice Lewis Powell, the deciding vote in
Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 case that Lawrence would overturn. 59 Smith
long wondered whether his failure to confide in Powell cost him a chance
to swing his vote.o Smith argued that equal protection and due process
rights, privacy in particular, guaranteed homosexuals the kind of civil
liberties that laws against homosexual sodomy denied them. Smith further
appealed to a rapidly developing social acceptance of homosexuality.
His argument, the winning argument, had the weight of dozens of
amicus briefs documenting these developments, not least among them the
work of Yale historian George Chauncey. Chauncey argued that laws
against homosexual behavior were a historical aberration. The amicus
brief submitted by Chauncey and his collaborators in this landmark case
led to the biggest win for academic historians before the Court since
Brown v. Board of Education.6 1 The brief was signed by some of the most
celebrated scholars of sexuality and gender in the United States.
Historians challenged two points crucial to Texas's argument. First, they
argued that same-sex sodomy, in contrast to sodomy more broadly, was
not a consistent target throughout history.62 Second, they contended that
governmental discrimination against homosexuals only became
widespread in the twentieth century.63 It had peaked in the early days of
the Cold War and was already on the wane. The brief sought to establish
that until the twentieth century, there had been no concept of a
"homosexual" as a separate class of citizens. "The phrase 'homosexual
sodomy' would have been literally incomprehensible to the Framers of the
Constitution."'
The Chauncey brief noted that laws or proscriptions against sodomy
mainly targeted heterosexuals, even married couples. Such laws
essentially prohibited any kind of non-procreative sex. The historians
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For background information on this case, see
DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LA WRENCE V. TEXAS (2012).
60. CARPENTER, supra note 59, at 213.
61. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
62. Brief for Professors of History George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2.
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argued there was no time-honored practice of discriminating against
homosexuals as homosexuals. An originalist reading of the Constitution
could not therefore justify laws against homosexual sodomy.
The lawyers who led the charge for Lawrence welcomed amicus
submissions like this one. Lamda's lead attorney, Ruth Harlow, said,
"Those briefs were important to show just how widespread the feeling was
that these kinds of laws crossed the line."" According to Dale Carpenter,
author of a case study on Lawrence, "This was the legal equivalent of a
combined land, sea, and air assault by sophisticated twenty-first century
weaponry on a ramshackle nineteenth-century edifice."66
But what if American history were replete with laws that targeted
homosexuals specifically? Would these same historians have argued that
the law was justified in proscribing homosexual sodomy in perpetuity?
Adopting originalist arguments should give pause to historians who do not
want to see the law of the present molded to conform with the often
repressive laws of the past.67 Another group of historians could, of course,
counterargue that founding-era morality stood quite clear on sexual
deviance. It is hard to believe that Puritans or Victorian-era Americans for
that matter would be particularly bothered by laws prohibiting homosexual
sodomy.68 Justice Scalia's point on the history might well have been the
meat of another historical brief: "whether homosexual sodomy was
prohibited by a law targeted at same-sex sexual relations or by a more
general law prohibiting both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, the
only relevant point is that it was criminalized."6 9
Historians might on occasion win originalist arguments framed around
the premise that the past should be normative for the present; sometimes,
as here, they will win big. But if historians continue looking toward the
past to preserve rights in the present and future, their work could backfire.
They risk accepting the legitimacy of originalist argumentation when
doing so endangers civil liberties, which do not always have a great deal to
lean on in America's unequal past.
65. CARPENTER, supra note 59, at 86.
66. Id.
67. Scholars, at least those unaffiliated with originalist thinking, have not to my knowledge
argued that historians risk their credibility in advancing this type of argument. See generally Ronald
Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Decision Making in the Twenty-First
Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25 (2007) (exploring the so-called "Social
Construction Process" at work in the opinion).
68. A historians' brief submitted in the Windsor case acknowledges that, while sodomy laws
historically targeted non-procreative sex more broadly, "[P]uritan clergy vigorously condemned the
'unnatural uncleanness when men with men commit filthiness, and women with women,' in part
because they worried that all people were subject to such temptations." Brief for the Organization of
American Historians and the American Studies Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
Edith Windsor at 7, United States v. Windsor, _ U.S. (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter OAH
Brief] (citing Richard Godbeer, "The Cry ofSodom ": Discourse, Intercourse, and Desire in Colonial
New England, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 259, 264-265 (1995)).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 596 (2003).
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III. THE HABEAS CASES AND THE POWER OF PRECEDENT
This Part will show how historians in the post-9/11 habeas cases
provided the Court with helpful precedential studies, on the one hand, and
watched the Court ignore the historical examples offered in analyses
dissociated from precedent, on the other. In the habeas cases, historians
believed that the Court would need to rely upon history because the
Constitution had incorporated the ancient, common-law writ of habeas
corpus. Legal historians hoped to instruct the Court on the writ's scope, as
it had functioned in England just before Independence. Though historians
wrote on behalf of the winning party each time, only their brief in Rasul v.
Bush70 and one of four briefs in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld7l addressed the kind
of history the Court felt most at ease citing: old cases.
By focusing on precedent, these historians employed an alternative
historical technique to originalist analysis for influencing the Court.
Indeed, in a common-law system, binding or persuasive court rulings
serve as the most apt representative of the past in adjudication. Historians
should learn from the habeas cases that in constitutional litigation there is
thus no more powerful tool than precedent. They are especially well-
equipped to uncover older cases and explain their context to the Court.
The pursuit of precedent in post-9/11 adjudication stands as a strong
alternative to original-intent analysis, one that avoids the fraught nature of
trying to speak with certainty about or assigning normative weight to the
past.
A. Rasul
In December of 2001, American troops captured Shafiq Rasul, Asif
Iqbal, and David Hicks in Afghanistan. U.S. forces transferred and
detained them in Guantanamo.7 2 The three petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus. Rasul and Iqbal, British citizens, and Hicks, an Australian,
requested their release, along with the right to privileged communication
with attorneys.73 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia denied their petitions, ruling that Guantanamo Bay was not a
sovereign territory of the United States.74 The court held that it had no
jurisdiction. So too did the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.7 5 On April 20, 2004, two and a half years after their
capture, the Supreme Court finally heard the petitioners' argument.
Reversing the court below, it held that Guantanamo Bay was functionally
70. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
71. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
72. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470.
73. Id.








The historians' brief in this matter sought to clarify the reach of the writ.
These historians wanted to help the Court understand the writ as the
Constitution's Framers understood it. As the Court observed in Rasul,
"Such historical evidence has long been considered by the Court as
important in interpreting the writ's availability and scope as guaranteed by
the Suspension Clause and federal habeas statutes.""6 The brief relied on
pre-constitutional British law to argue that questions over sovereignty in
Guantanamo should not bar habeas claims. The British writ was not
contingent on total sovereignty over the land in question. Rather, "an
English court's determination of whether it could issue the writ beyond the
realm turned primarily on the crown's control over the territory and the
ability of English judges to enforce the writ, not the particular label
ascribed to the territory."7
According to the brief, the King's Bench in Westminster increasingly
asserted its authority to issue writs of habeas corpus directly to persons
detained in territories overseas, particularly where a territory lacked local
courts capable of issuing and enforcing the writ." Because the British
exercised legal control over territories even before they had full
sovereignty, they naturally saw habeas as a part of the empire's governing
regime. Habeas corpus signified the rule of law and English justice.
Fittingly, local courts issued some form of habeas corpus, even on behalf
of non-subjects, in English-controlled territories over which the crown had
not formally asserted sovereignty.79
The majority opinion, which sided with the detainees, cited the brief's
central analysis at length. The Court first acknowledged that it had
considered the "historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus."so Once it
settled on history as the deciding factor, it adopted the same conclusions
as the brief. The Court reasoned: "At common law, courts exercised
habeas jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign
territory of the realm, as well as the claims of persons detained in the so-
called 'exempt jurisdictions,' where ordinary writs did not run, and all
76. Brief for Legal Historians Listed Herein as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 15. The effort to outline the formidable authority of English law in quasi-English realms
seems in retrospect to be the brief s most interesting device. The historians appealed to the strength of
English imperialism as an analog to America's own empire. If America was as mighty as its English
forebear, and its empire as vast or vaster, then even semi-sovereign territory like Guantanamo Bay
should operate under American law. If the United States was looking to spread a Pax Americana
around the world, then the rule of law could not be an afterthought. This argument served as a kind of
legal judo. It took the opponents' credos-America is strong; America spreads freedom and
democracy-and used it against them. But these sorts of thematic arguments, ones historians take
pride in making in their own work, were not quite what the Court would end up applying.
80. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-82 (2004).
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other dominions under the sovereign's control.""1
The historians had a clear path to the heart of the Court's holding, but it
was a path paved by precedent, not history per se. The brief's arguments
were more precedential than historical. A lawyer would be just as
qualified to make these points, if not more so. Alas, the cited cases are not
so easily found in online legal databases. The main utility and
effectiveness of this historians' brief lay not so much in the analysis,
which lawyers can do, but in the research itself. Certain topics, such as
habeas corpus, lean on precedents found not in the repositories that
lawyers typically access, but rather in the archive, the domain of the
historian. The historians' victory in these cases can be best explained by
the fact that they served less as historians and more as paralegals who
were unusually nimble in finding cases from the past.
B. Hamdan
A year later, another headlining habeas case originated in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. This time, it began with
a decision favorable to the petitioners.82 Judge James Robertson ruled that
the Government had a burden to show that the detainee, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, was not a prisoner of war. Prisoners of war had specific rights
guaranteed by the Geneva Convention.8 3 Presumptively, those jailed in
Guantanamo were prisoners of war, whose rights could not be
circumscribed unless the government specifically showed that they were
"unlawful enemy combatants."84 The D.C. Circuit disagreed." And the
Supreme Court reversed, ruling five to three (with Chief Justice Roberts
recusing himself because he sat on the panel below) that U.S. courts did
have jurisdiction." The administration could not hold military tribunals
without explicit congressional authorization.
Pamela Karlan had spearheaded an amicus campaign on behalf of
Stanford's Supreme Court Clinic.87 Robert Middlekauf, Jack Rakove, and
Fred Anderson joined a group of distinguished historians who hoped to
instruct the Court on the original meaning of the Vesting Clause of Article
II. According to the brief, Article II did not authorize the President's
actions in Guantanamo.88 The Court, which did not cite the historians'
81. Id.





87. Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184).
88. Id. at 3. The brief captured a central characteristic of the Early Republic, a characteristic that
historians could argue originalists approach inconsistently. The Founders did not have the people's
support for expansive or broad central powers. When they advocate for a strong military and wide
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brief, may have been less likely to listen to outsiders on broad questions of
constitutional power. It was a history lesson that the Court probably felt it
did not need.
Another brief, signed by Lawrence Friedman and other historians,
offered the Barbary Wars as a founding-era analogue for the Global War
on Terror.89 The Barbary brief was filled with timeworn references,
including first-hand correspondence on the late eighteenth-century
conflict. The Barbary Wars made for an appealing point of reference for
the Court. Even in dealing with pirates, whom the historians describe as
stateless terrorists, the Founders believed in playing by the rules. In those
days, the rules were known as the "Law of Nations."
The brief, another exercise in originalist interpretation, wanted to make
clear that the Founders did not look for excuses to reject the rule of law,
even when they fought those who would happily fight dirty: "Despite the
unlawful combat of their enemies, the Founders acted in accordance with
international law and custom."90 The brief detailed all of the ways in
which the corsairs of the Barbary Wars violated the norms of combat. It
must have been tempting, the brief suggests, for the Founders to do the
same. But they did not. They faced a conflict against stateless enemies
who repeatedly violated international law. Nevertheless, the United States
maintained its adherence to the law of nations.9' The Court did not cite
this brief or mention the Barbary Wars.
Only one brief managed to follow the example of precedential history
from Rasul. In a fog of uncertain legality, the World War Two case, Ex
Parte Quirin, stood out as one of the few cases that could guide the Court.
It involved military tribunals for captured German saboteurs. 92 But rather
than simply cite case law, the historians took the concept of precedential
history further, using the tools of their trade to distinguish Quirin from the
case before the Court. Historian Michael Belknap joined three legal
scholars on a brief as experts on Quirin. To be clear, their argument was
not neutral: "Legal historians have uncovered a wealth of information
casting grave doubt on Quirin's precedential value."9 3 The Quirin brief
drove home the argument that "Quirin is poisoned precedent" and "should
authority for the executive, originalists who seek a limited national government want to have their
cake and eat it too.
89. Brief for Lawrence M. Friedman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner [Barbary Wars
Precedent], Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184). Friedman's known expertise is
not the Barbary wars, it should be noted, but he is a pioneer in the broader field of American legal
history. His name would make a clerk hesitate before sending the brief into the recycling bin. But it is
worth asking whether name-dropping should become the norm in these efforts.
90. Id. at 1-2.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Brief for Legal Scholars and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner [Effect of
Quirin], Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Quirin Brief] (citing Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
93. Id. at 6.
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be repudiated." 94 The brief was not cited, but its authors were vindicated;
Quirin did not play a substantial role in the Court's opinion. Historians
today would be well advised to use this brief as an example of
precedential history that goes beyond locating pertinent, dusty cases and
that uses historical methods to differentiate cases that the Court might
otherwise cite as on point.
C. Boumediene
Lakhdar Boumediene, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the
central protagonist in the third and last of the habeas cases under
consideration here. Boumediene v. Bush arose after Congress had passed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which was the congressional
response to Hamdan." The Act approved the commissions that the
executive had already established. It included language that abrogated the
habeas rights of all captives, even those with petitions still pending.9 6
Because of the Act, Boumediene's lawyers faced the more challenging
prospect of convincing the Court to invalidate a statute on constitutional
grounds.
Their first significant resistance came from the D.C. Circuit. In 2007, a
two-to-one decision upheld Congress's authority to suspend habeas for
Guantanamo detainees.97 All seemed lost when the Court declined review
later in 2007. But just a few months afterward, the Court reversed its
decision and granted certiorari.98
The case drew nearly two dozen amicus briefs supporting Boumediene,
including one from the American Civil Liberties Union.99 Another group
of historians also decided to write; they wanted to address once again the
general historical circumstances surrounding the Constitution's habeas
suspension clause. 00 Doing so, they felt, would show the Court that
Congress did not have the authority to suspend habeas through the
Military Commissions Act.
After the Court's reversal on certiorari, it was little surprise that the
Court split on the merits. Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice
Kennedy wrote an originalist exposition on habeas: "[T]hat the Framers
considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual
94. Id.
95. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
96. See id. § 7.
97. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
98. See Anthony Clark Arend, Supreme Court Reverses Its Decision, Will Rehear Boumediene
and Al Odah, EXPLOREGEORGETOWN (June 29, 2007, 2:26 PM), http://blogs.georgetown.edul?id
=25463.
99. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and Public Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
100. Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196) [hereinafter Boumediene Briefj.
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liberty is evident from the care taken in the Suspension Clause to specify
the limited grounds for its suspension."' 0 ' Once again, the question boiled
down to whether the writ applied to Guantanamo. According to the Court,
it did not matter that the prisoners were detained in a naval base rather
than on U.S. soil. As the majority put it bluntly, "the Government's
argument that the Clause affords petitioners no rights because the United
States does not claim sovereignty over the naval station is rejected."' 0 2
After Hamdan, the Bush administration obtained the Congressional
authorization it thought it needed to conduct military tribunals for
Guantanamo detainees. The lone group of historians to submit a brief
suggested that the courts were still unconstitutional. They wrote under the
auspices of the Yale International Human Rights Clinic.0 3 Scholars of the
founding era felt it fell to them to detail exactly what authority the
Constitution's Framers had vested in both the Congress and the
executive. 04 The Court's majority even cited the brief on the key point of
the writ's applicability to extra-territorial captives. But it did not agree
with the historians' interpretation. According to the Court, its analogy to
the writ's use in India was not on point.
Although the Court may ultimately have reached the same legal
conclusion as the historians, it did not agree with the analogy-laden
historical interpretation that the historians offered in support of their
conclusion. This effort, then, resembled what the Rakove brief had tried to
accomplish in Hamdan. Documenting just how important the writ of
habeas corpus was to those who drafted and signed the Constitution, these
scholars wanted to show the Court that it should not take suspension
lightly.'0o This brief's conclusion-that Congress's action "constitutes an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by limiting access
to federal courts by persons detained by the United States at the United
States Naval Base in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba"-was adopted by the
Court. 06
Although the Court may ultimately have reached the same legal
conclusion as the historians, it did not agree with the analogy-laden
historical interpretation that the historians offered in support of their
conclusion. "The Supreme Court of Judicature (the British Court) sat in
Calcutta; but no federal court sits at Guantanamo."' 07 The Court concluded
that history could not provide an exact analog: "In none of the cases cited
do we find that a common-law court would or would not have granted, or
101. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
102. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 725.
103. Boumediene Brief, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
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refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatan[t]."os
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, took aim at the historians as well. "Despite
three opening briefs, three reply briefs, and support from a legion of amici,
petitioners have failed to identify a single case in the history of Anglo-
American law that supports their claim to jurisdiction."' 09 Justice Scalia,
like the majority, wanted cases, not history lessons.
The law of suspension itself bore a direct link to the habeas rights as
they existed at the time of framing. If there was a moment for historian-
authored originalism it might have been this one. However, even here,
originalism fell short, as the attacks of 9/11 and the detainment in
Guantanamo were both quite unprecedented. India and the Barbary Wars
were "distinguishable" in the legal sense. Although the Court ruled in the
habeas cases in favor of the parties for which the historians' briefs
advocated, the historians' arguments were not dispositive for the Court's
rulings. The Justices in the majority simply decided that the legal
principles underpinning habeas could not be abrogated by presidential fiat.
They would have ruled the same way without the historical contributions.
Ultimately, arguing for one interpretation of history over another will
always leave the law vulnerable. Precedent, on the other hand, lies
squarely within the Court's professional and institutional competence.
Historians could dig up the past all they wanted, but they were not going
to find anything quite like the problems that post-9/11 America
confronted. It was precisely because of the particularity of the post-9/11
moment that attempts to analogize constitutionally ambiguous tactics in
the War on Terror to historical situations proved futile.
IV. SOLUTIONS
This Part provides three suggestions for reform that track and
correspond to the three areas of concern outlined above. I follow these
with a set of practical proposals that should amplify the voice of historians
before the Court and make their amicus advocacy more successful.
A. Destabilizing Originalist History
My first proposal speaks directly to historians' discomfort with
certainty. Historians can make their advocacy more effective-and more
in line with their professional methodology-by using alternative (rather
than definitive) versions of the past to destabilize originalist
argumentation. Briefs intended to destabilize originalist interpretations of
the past should not fight fire with fire. Historians should not counter an
108. Id.
109. Id at 847.
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overly certain and inevitably partial version of the past with one that is
equally certain and just as partial. Instead, they should seek to undermine a
fundamental assumption on which originalists stand: that a single past
awaits discovery.
Most of the briefs I have reviewed in this Note employed the
"destabilizing" strategy to varying degrees. At least superficially, there is
not much difference between advancing an alternative interpretation
simply to dispute the historical accuracy of an opposing one and a brief
that offers an alternative, but definitive interpretation meant to replace it.
But it is more than a semantic distinction. Historians who believe that
originalism's claim to historical certainty is suspect can employ historical
advocacy to discredit it. They can also show the Court and the legal
community that professional historians have more than vague,
philosophical misgivings about law office history. A careful, concrete
exploration of the past that reveals a plausible alternative interpretation is
itself a rebuke of the originalist presumption that there existed in the past
one single original intent that we, in the present, can identify with
certainty. As such, it is more than another, independent original-intent
argument. Historians should even consider making this point explicit in
the brief itself. In doing so, they would argue not that their interpretation
of events is the right one, but rather that because theirs is equally credible,
the Court should not rest its decision on a historical misconception.
Although I earlier admonished historians by way of the Lawrence
example, I believe historians can learn from their experience in that case.
By focusing much more on demolishing their opponents' originalist
conclusions rather than merely proffering their own, they showed how
historians could have a voice before the Court that does not contradict
their professional ethic. Writing a brief on this tack, however, is easier
said than done. The historians in Lawrence, for example, had the
advantage of a published Supreme Court opinion that they felt got its
history wrong.
Their criticism of Bowers did not go unrecognized by the author of
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy. In diagramming what was wrong with
Bowers, Kennedy explained: "[T]here are fundamental criticisms of the
historical premises relied upon by the majority and concurring opinions in
Bowers . . . . [T]he following considerations counsel against adopting the
definitive conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance."iio Justice
Kennedy adopted the viewpoint of the historians who submitted their
brief: because the past could not be ascertained with certainty, the Court
could not allow Bowers to deny a minority group its civil rights,
particularly because the reasoning in that case relied upon certainty.
The opinion concludes: "In summary, the historical grounds relied upon
110. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-68 (2003).
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in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not
without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.""' Once the history
was found to be wrong, Bowers was left with nothing to stand on. The
case helps us understand today the difference between writing an
originalist brief and writing a brief that destabilizes originalism. The latter
serves as an assassin's bullet. Rather than replace one speciously confident
perspective on the past with another, it seeks simply to introduce enough
uncertainty to the discussion to keep bad history from supporting a bad
decision.
The historians in Lawrence successfully engaged their opponents by
attacking their originalist conclusions about history. They succeeded
largely because they had broken down their opponents' historical logic,
not because they proved that the past was kind to homosexuals. Justice
Kennedy recognized this when he wrote, "history and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry."112
The destabilizing route will be available to historians in nearly any case
because the past is so tough to wrangle into a linear narrative. This is
knowledge hard won by historians as a collective and something each
individual historian has learned on his or her own, too. The past is
quicksilver; if a case or issue hangs by a single strand of interpretation, a
historian can always find a way to undercut it. In a particularly thorny or
high-profile case, it may be possible to shake the confidence a swing
Justice has placed in a particular perspective on the past.
B. Rejecting the Normative Weight of the Past Through "Constitutional
Fidelity "
The fact that historians may not want to give the past normative weight,
an issue I examine in Part Two, gives them an opening to pursue a bolder
type of advocacy. Rather than be handcuffed, as originalists are, by the
judgments and attitudes of people long since dead, some historians might
prefer to identify change over time in search of more contemporaneous
constitutional interpretations.
In so doing, historians can adopt alternatives to originalism such as
"living constitution" analysis or "constitutional fidelity." The second
should be especially intriguing to them. Pamela Karlan, along with
California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu and Christopher
Schroeder, define constitutional fidelity, which they present as an
alternative to originalism, as follows: "Fidelity to the Constitution requires
111. Id at571.
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judges to ask not how its general principles would have been applied in
1789 or 1868, but rather how [they] should be applied today in order to
preserve their power and meaning in light of the concerns, conditions and
evolving norms of our society.""' A constitutionally faithful brief would
advance arguments rooted in the notion that the United States Constitution
should be conceptualized not only according to the letter of the law but
according to its spirit too.
Historians could highlight constitutional principles as they have shaped
the country since its founding and as they apply to particular issues. They
can research and document constitutional trends and the social and
political changes that moved them. Take the Commerce Clause, for
example. A historian, particularly an economic historian, could trace the
transformation of the American economy to help us understand how
today's version of the clause could be more faithful to its original spirit.
There are many developments the Founders could not have foreseen. A
history of these changes might seek, for example, to help the Court
understand why marijuana grown in a backyard is part of a stream of
commerce that is within the Constitution's purview.114 The reach of the
Commerce Clause may have grown along with the economy, but the
principle underlying it, historians could try to demonstrate, has remained
faithful to the Constitution.
Historians who spurn originalism in favor of alternative interpretative
schemes in their briefs might ask not what Thomas Jefferson would do,
but what he would have done had the historians of today explained to him
history's unfolding. Such briefs would allow historians who are interested
in advocacy to put their perspective on the public record. But rather than
speak to original intent, historians could show how much the country and
the Constitution have changed since the eighteenth century. This
approach, more in line with the historians' professional worldview, would
afford the Court an opportunity to better understand what within the law
has stood steadfast. Even if the bench proved uninterested, these histories
could serve as a kind of "past in exile." Historians can approach them as
Judges do dissents, hoping one day for their arguments to become
authoritative. For the time being, these arguments can serve as a running,
open letter objecting to the way originalists see the Constitution's past and
present.
113. KARLAN, Liu & SCHROEDER, supra note 1, at 26. Jack Balkin's views on the Constitution
also represent an option that fits better with the Weltanschauung of historians. "[Balkin] argues that
the Constitution's legitimacy derives from a historical process of continual popular commitment to see
in the Constitution the possibility of redeeming the document's own promises of a more just society."
Michael Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2012 (reviewing JACK BALKIN,
LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)).
114. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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C. The Special Master Approach
In order to address the third problem area for historical advocacy, that
historians are much more effective when they focus on precedent, I offer
this proposal: historians can narrow the focus of their amicus briefs to
precedential or factual matters, eschewing outright advocacy as much as
possible. The best way to conceptualize such an approach is to imagine
historians as "special masters."' 15 The questions present in a Supreme
Court case are likely to be different from those in a historian's prior
research. Given that reality, Peter Hoffer believes historians can be
appointed just as special masters might be.1 16 As such, they could submit
their interpretations or recommendations directly to the Court.'
If the Court had narrowed its historical inquiry to a question of fact-
the percentage of households owning guns in the first twenty years of
independence, for example-a special master could be afforded the time
and resources to investigate and return with an answer. Matthew Festa
agrees with Hoffer,
The best practice for courts would be to use court-appointed
historical experts in addition to-but not to the exclusion of-
those proffered by the parties. Additionally, lawyers and judges ...
who give due attention to historians' methods will have a
substantial advantage in offering, countering, analyzing, or
evaluating historical evidence." 8
The Court could also create a new institution of historical research, akin
to the Congressional Research Service, to make this a reality. But rather
than wait for this unlikely event, historians can assume the role of special
masters voluntarily by submitting amicus briefs that are narrowly tailored
and at least on their face fact-driven and neutral.
There are three types of briefs that fit the bill, the first two of which
follow the more successful precedential histories historians offered in the
habeas cases. First, historians can, as in Rasul, submit a brief that brings to
the Court's attention older cases that might be persuasive, cases the Court
might otherwise not have found. Second, historians can submit case-
specific briefs that attempt to contextualize a case that could prove central
to a particular matter. Take the Quirin example from Hamdan above."19
That brief offered the historians' perspective on a case they believed
would factor heavily into the Court's decision. Or, third, historians can try
115. This idea came from the Hoffer Interview, supra note 13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
116. Hoffer Interview, supra note 13.
117. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, PAST IMPERFECT: FACTS, FICTIONS, FRAUD AMERICAN
HISTORY FROM BANCROFT AND PARKMAN TO AMBROSE, BELLESILES, ELLIS, AND GOODWIN, 125-26
(2007).
118. Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L.
REv. 479, 552 (2008).
119. Quirin Brief, supra note 92.
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to uncover helpful, admittedly extrajudicial, historical facts, such as the
example of gun ownership I mentioned above.
A purely "neutral" effort is not exactly en vogue in amicus briefs, which
are meant to favor one party. Moreover, it may never be possible to
divorce "facts" fully from the conclusions that those facts are meant to
support. I argue here only that historians might try to zero in on narrow
precedential or factual questions. These first steps toward a "neutral"
alternative represent a humbler approach that could make historians more
sanguine about writing briefs and make their brief-writing efforts more
effective. Perhaps most importantly, such an approach would keep
historians from having to declare that a law has a definitive original
meaning. Instead, they would provide the Court, as best they can, with
"just the facts."
D. Strategic Enhancements
Historians can also consider pragmatic improvements to make their
briefs more effective before the Court. Anyone who wants the Court to
judge the past in a more honest, considerate, and comprehensive way
would want historians to have at least some say before the Court.
Historians who harbor such hopes themselves can adopt these small
measures to give them more clout before the Court.
1. Coordination
As of now, the practice of amicus brief writing seems more or less
spontaneous. Law school clinics or law firms can draft legal scholars into
submitting a brief. But there is no systematic process for selecting the best
historians for the job or the best issues for involving them. Moreover,
there is no oversight to keep the process as transparent as possible. A
committee within the American Society for Legal History, for example,
could direct historians' efforts. The American Bar Association, itself
responsible for many briefs, would serve as a good model. An amicus
brief submitted by the Organization of American Historians in the
Windsor case can point the way forward.120
2. Expertise
Historians should also try signing their names only when they have had
a real opportunity to weigh in on the content and when the final product
does not contradict their research. Briefs are not and should not be mere
"petitions." Saul Cornell advises his colleagues not to "sign briefs you
120. See OAH Brief, supra note 68. The brief avoids original-intent analysis in favor of providing
the Court with helpful historical context on discrimination against homosexuals. It is a model worth
emulating for this reason as well.
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don't read closely and ... in fields far afield from your research and core
teaching fields."l 21 Rakove puts a similar sentiment a bit more colorfully:
"Everything you should do should be consistent with your scholarship;
you don't want to become a constitutional hooker, so to speak." 22
Finkelman likewise warns, "Don't sign off on some law office history that
some law firm put together." 23 The end goal: every historian's brief
would come from true experts. Were this true, any law clerk who picked
one up from the tall stack of briefs would know the product had been
thoroughly and thoughtfully researched. Regardless of whether this makes
briefs better, or more honest, it could, at least in this way, make them more
effective.
3. Cert Stage Briefs
Historians are most likely to tip the scales at the certriorari stage. "It is
generally understood now that amicus briefs are more valuable at the cert
stage than at the merits stage," says Jonathan Hacker, an O'Melveny &
Myers partner in D.C. who co-chairs the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers Committee that decides on amicus filings.' 24 "They have
a strong signaling effect on the Court." 25 These days, the likelihood of
landing on the Court's shrinking schedule is so small, that finding a place
on its docket is a triumph in its own right.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have not held back their quills trying to understand, explain,
and explore originalism and its role before the Court. They have largely
focused on how the Court has gotten history wrong,126 or tried to
understand how it became such a powerful force in Court precedent.127
They have not yet, however, reached a consensus on how historians
should engage the Court and how it, in turn, should use history.
This Note seeks to start constructing that consensus around principles
121. Email from Saul Cornell, Professor of History, Fordham Univ., to Joshua Sten (June 22,
2012, 07:47 EST) (on file with author).
122. Email from Jack Rakove, Professor of History, Stanford Univ., to Joshua Stein (June 15,
2012, 14:08 EST) (on file with author).
123. Finkelman Interview, supra note 12.
124. Tony Mauro and Marcia Coyle, To Get on the Argument Docket, it Helps to Have Friends,
NAT'L L.J. (July 28, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNUjsp?id=1202463990959.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Cornell, New Originalism, supra note 38 (impugning the use of history by
originalists).
127. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REv. 191 (2008); see also Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. the Lawyer's
Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 295 (2011) (arguing that "contemporary political preferences are shuffled around and made
to appear to be part of an original meaning").
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that are central to the professional practice of history. It speaks to
historians, who can reinvigorate their efforts while refocusing them around
arguments that are true to their convictions about the past. It also aims to
raise a greater awareness among legal practitioners that their handling of
the past is, and will continue to be, under assault by professional
historians. Should they (judges especially) so choose, they can change
their approach on principle alone. Alternatively, they might, for
instrumental reasons, consider that a new perspective on history may help
them win some legal arguments.
Many historians do not want to be confused with advocates. Stanley
Katz, for one, proposes that historians should be careful about putting their
name behind out-and-out advocacy: "I don't have many suggestions, other
than to remind historians that they need to check their judicial politics at
the door and give Clio their best shot."12 8 Jane Larson and Clyde
Spillenger, in their handwringing over historians' efforts before the Court,
went so far as to ask, "Is a legal brief what historians should do?"' 29
Katz argues that briefs, done carefully, can preserve historical fidelity:
"[C]ourts who use historical knowledge [or] arguments ought to use
history accurately and responsibly, avoiding if possible the 'lawyer's
history' . . . . Our job is to provide the Court with the best historical
knowledge availabl[e]."' 3 0 Katz nevertheless fears that historians' work
will be abused by a Court that does not care much about historical
integrity: "My guess is that [history] is, alas, most important for those
judges who want to buttress an otherwise weak interpretation and for
whom, therefore, history may be their best argument.""'3
Historians will, I hope, press ahead in their efforts regardless of the
thorniness of the endeavor or the small likelihood of having an impact.132
They can use their expertise in a direct and powerful way to serve the
public good. The amicus brief is a great vehicle for scholars who want to
do so. But facing apathy, or worse, as the likeliest reward for their efforts,
128. Email from Stanley Katz, Professor in Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ., to
Joshua Stein (June 25, 2012, 14:10 EST) (on file with author) [herinafter Katz Interview]. In Greek
mythology, Clio serves as the historians' muse and serves today as a symbol of historical integrity and
honesty.
129. Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger, "That's Not History": The Boundaries ofAdvocacy and
Scholarship, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 33, 36.
130. Katz Interview, supra note 128.
13 1. Id.
132. It is, I believe, a particularly opportune moment to consider how historians attempt to leave
their mark on jurisprudence as law professors, who are much more frequent advocates before the
Court, are also rethinking their brief-writing methods. Legal scholar Richard Fallon recently urged his
colleagues at law schools to adopt a more cautious approach to amicus briefs. He suggests a few
guidelines, such as submitting briefs that do not advocate for a particular side but instead serve an
illustrative or expositive purpose. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars' Briefs and the Vocation of a Law
Professor, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223 (2012). But see Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars'Briefs: A
Response to Richard Fallon (Jan. 2, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1978337 (arguing
that the standards of academia should not apply to briefs).
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historians may find it difficult to continue submitting briefs.
The fact is that historians can never control the use of history by courts,
not to mention the public at large. They face a situation similar to that of
professional scientists who compete with armchair experts every day in
the public debate over climate change. Scientists press onward in spite of
this vexing reality; so, too, should historians. Simply because histories
exist outside of their control ought not license historians to surrender.
This Note highlights alternatives to originalist advocacy that can free
historians from many of these frustrations. Just because historians' briefs
may not tell us the law's original meaning does not mean it is time for
historians to go gently into the night. Historians may be fallible and
political. But they are a resource. Their ability to do archival research, to
tease out larger trends, and, most of all, to offer diverging, discordant
views of the past can make them extremely useful to the Court and to the
country.
To be sure, the tools of history are different from those of the law.
Historians appreciate a past that is untidy and complicated; jurists hope to
identify a single, correct result. Historians do not like using the past to
pass judgment on the present; originalists think doing so is essential. I
agree with Neil Richards, who tackled this issue more than fifteen years
ago, concluding that history cannot and should not have all of the Court's
answers. According to Richards, "When history is ambiguous, the Court
should use some other method to decide its cases and not try to ask
questions of the past that the past cannot answer."l33
Nevertheless, historians want history to be useful. But historical
advocacy before the Court should not come at the cost of reproducing the
errors of originalists, that is, of pushing the Court to see the past as more
simplistic than it is (or was) and of urging the Court to view the past as the
definitive normative guide for the present. Rather, by correcting these
ways in which originalists misuse history, historians can maintain a
continuing relevance before the Court. They can also push those in the
legal world to see history as they do.
The historical past should not always play an important role in legal
decisions, especially not when text or precedent suggest a clearer path. But
when the past does figure in a decision, the Court should welcome input
from professional historians. Likewise, historians should feel that they can
meaningfully contribute beyond speaking to original intentions. Within the
framework suggested in this Note, historians can pursue a strategy that
suits their profession and puts their versions of the past on the public
record. Whether the Court listens is and always has been its prerogative.
Be that as it may, members not only of the bench but also of the bar lose
133. Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 891 (1997).
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something of value if historians bow out of amicus advocacy altogether. If
jurists are willing to listen to and engage with historians, even without
always agreeing with them, then the legal community will benefit from a
deeper, richer understanding of the past.
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